I'm sure I am naïve, but I have a hard time believing that the five power conferences can succeed in excluding other conferences or independents who are willing to live by the same rules be it under the NCAA umbrella or as a breakaway.
These five power conferences (and the individual schools within these conferences) are competitors. Yet, they are clearly working together in an effort to protect the market (i.e. the highest level of college football) from other competing conferences and schools. If they are successful, they will freeze out any future competition for the media money they are receiving from ESPN and others because of the agreements have made amongst themselves. No potential competitor will have access to this market - not because they can't compete per se, but because they have been contractually excluded.
I may not be a big fan of the American conference as the ultimate landing spot for UConn, but, to the extent the American chooses to compete with the power five conferences under the same rules, it should be allowed to do so. The American may not have the media deals that the P5 has at the moment, but that cannot justify the P5 schools imposing artificial restraints on its ability to achieve the same or a greater level of success in the future.
I'm not an antitrust lawyer, and I understand that there are nuances in specialized areas of the law that legal summaries cannot address, but, to extent these competing conferences (and individual schools within these conferences) agree to freeze out other conferences and schools and not play those schools, etc., such conduct would appear to violate antitrust law as a market allocation scheme:
Market Division
Market division or allocation schemes are agreements in which competitors divide markets among themselves. In such schemes, competing firms allocate specific customers or types of customers, products, or territories among themselves. For example, one competitor will be allowed to sell to, or bid on contracts let by, certain customers or types of customers. In return, he or she will not sell to, or bid on contracts let by, customers allocated to the other competitors. In other schemes, competitors agree to sell only to customers in certain geographic areas and refuse to sell to, or quote intentionally high prices to, customers in geographic areas allocated to conspirator companies.
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/211578.htm
The issue is exacerbated in my view by the billions in federal funding and favorable tax treatment that the institutions who are part of the P5 receive. The exclusionary agreements they are trying to achieve will damage other institutions and citizens of states who are not included. As I said before I'm probably naïve, but I can't believe that the executive branch, Congress or the courts would let it happen, as the government would be essentially funding this artificial power-play to solidify the haves and have-nots.