@RockyMTblue2 did an incredible job of explaining the background of employment discrimination law and certain jurisdictional prerequisites. Here is my supplement to
@RockyMTblue2 's commentary.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it an unlawful employment practice for employers subject to the Act to discriminate against any individual with respect to “compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” because of that person’s race, color, sex, religion, and national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). The statute also prohibits segregating or limiting employees/applicants based on one of the mentioned protected categories in any way that deprives them of employment opportunities.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2).
An employee/claimant in an employment discrimination case can proceed under two theories of discrimination: “disparate treatment and disparate impact.”
Enlow v. Salem-Keizer Yellow Cab Co., Inc., 389 F.3d 802, 811 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing
Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 609 (1993)).
“Disparate treatment is demonstrated when the employer simply treats some people less favorably than others because of [a protected characteristic].” Id. (internal marks and quotation marks omitted).
“Disparate impact” is demonstrated when “employment practices that are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups . . . fall more harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified by business necessity.” Pottenger v. Potlatch Corp., 329 F.3d 740, 749 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, an employee/claimaint attempts to demonstrate that specific practices (and not the cumulative effect of the employer's selection practices) have adverse effects on a protected group. Examples of relatively recent case law in this area include lifting/physical requirements discriminating on the basis of sex or criminal background processes discriminating on the basis of race.
Disparate treatment claims must proceed along the lines of the praxis laid out by the Supreme Court in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) and its progeny.
Under a disparate treatment theory, claims of sex discrimination based on circumstantial evidence are analyzed under the
McDonnell Douglas burden shifting framework:
- An employee must carry the initial burden to establish a prima facie case that creates an inference of discrimination.
- If the employee has justified a presumption of discrimination, an inference of discrimination arises and the burden shifts to the employer to produce a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its employment action.
- If the employer does so, the burden shifts back to the employee to prove that the employer's explanation is a pretext for discrimination.
To establish a
prima facie case of sex discrimination, an employee must allege and demonstrate:
- He/she was a member of a protected class;
- He/she was performing his/her job satisfactorily or was qualified for a position sought;
- He/she was discharged or otherwise suffered an adverse employment action; and
- Similarly-situated individuals outside his/herr protected class were treated more favorably or other circumstances surrounding the adverse employment action give rise to an inference of discrimination.
Bodett v. CoxCom, Inc., 366 F.3d 736, 743 (9th Cir. 2004);
see also Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., Inc., 444 F.3d 1104, 1108-09 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding in order to assert a valid Title VII claim, a claimant must make out a
prima facie case establishing the challenged employment action was intentionally discriminatory).
Once a claimant establishes a
prima facie case, the employer must provide a legitimate explanation for its decision (the adverse employment action) that is non-discriminatory.
If the employer demonstrates a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action, the employee/claimant can prove discrimination only if he/she can demonstrate this proffered reason is actually pretext for discrimination.
Beck v. United Food and Commercial Workers Union, Local 99, 506 F.3d 874, 883-84 (9th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted);
Cornwell v. Electra Cent. Credit Union, 439 F.3d 1018, 1028 (9th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted).
The overall burden of proof for the employee/claimant in disparate treatment employment discrimination claims is by a preponderance of the evidence.
Furthermore, Title VII lawsuits are typically restricted to organizations that employ 15 people or more. The WBB staff at ND consists of 4 full time employees plus a grad assistant. If someone were going to bring a reverse discrimination lawsuit they would have to enlarge it to the entire ND athletic department, or the University as a whole. When you consider the makeup of the ND coaching staffs for football, MBB, baseball, etc. it would be impossible to make a case that ND systematically discriminated against male coaches.
The university of notre dame employs a lot more than 15 people
Other Statutory Requirements & Issues
Title VII does not provide a cause of action against supervisors or individual employees.
Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587-88 (9th Cir. 1993).
In terms of numerosity requirement, Title VII requires 15 or more employees in each of 20 or more calendar weeks during the current or preceding calendar year, as does the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b);
42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A). By contrast, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) has a threshold requirement of 20 or more employees for 20 calendar weeks during either the year in which the alleged discriminatory act occurred or the preceding year.
29 U.S.C. § 630(b).
Finally, Title VII (and employment discrimination statutes) prohibit claims by applicants/employees against employers --- not independent contractors, not subdivisions or departments, etc. In general, a department/division of an employer is a non-jural entity. As examples, departments and subordinate entities of municipalities, counties, and towns are not separate legal entities or bodies and do not have the capacity to sue or be sued, absent specific statutory authority to do so. So an employee wanting to bring a claim of sex discrimination resulting from employment with the Phoenix Police Department would properly bring the claim against the City of Phoenix, not PPD -- the City is the employer; PPD is a department and a subpart of the City of Phoenix, not a separate entity for purposes of suit.
@oldude , any employment discrimination claim would be against the university (Notre Dame) under employment discrimination statutes, not the ND WBB program or the ND Athletic Department, as the "employer"/entity is Notre Dame. As such, the numerosity threshold would easily be met.