For those who just want the UConn part:
The UConn scandal
Pelto had a front-row seat to the inner workings of the UConn administration and the mismanagement of the $1 billion construction project that was designed to upgrade the campus. Gov. Rell had appointed him to find out what happened when the project's major problems became glaringly apparent in 2005, with severe budget overruns and more than 100 fire and safety code violations that needed to be corrected. Pelto conservatively estimated the project's missteps cost at least $100 million in state money.
But two investigations — one by Pelto's commission and another by the UConn board of trustees — concluded many of the problems could have been avoided if somebody had blown the whistle after problems became apparent years earlier.
A handwritten memo on Emmert's stationery from 1998 lists a "summary of big issues" regarding the construction project. The memo outlines a debriefing by a company, PinnacleOne, which performed an audit that raised several serious concerns, including financial issues, problems with design standards and the experience of the staff working on the project.
"Mark Emmert's own notes indicate he was aware of at least six key issues," according to a report by a board of trustees member in 2005.
A new audit of the project in 2005 discovered the same problems that were in the audit seven years earlier — problems not brought to light at the time. Even UConn President Philip Austin said he recalled only a positive portrayal of the audit being passed on to him, though the commission found it hard to believe he also didn't know about the problems.
"We believe the handling of the report was consistent with the practice at the time to avoid the possibility of negative information becoming public," says the final report of the commission in 2005.
Pelto said the university might have feared losing funding or control of the project to the state if the problems had become known sooner. He said Emmert was in charge of the project and delegated responsibilities to others without keeping track of what was happening.
"It was just one massive screw-up after another," Pelto said.
Two of Emmert's former subordinates were placed on administrative leave and ultimately resigned.
By then, Emmert had left to become the chancellor at LSU in mid-1999. Pelto said the commission tried to interview him about the scandal but it was a "nonproductive discussion. (Emmert) said, 'I didn't know what was going on, and I thought it was taken care of.'"
