Your argument was that they did it in public, therefore it is Ok. That was really your argument.
The rest of your post does not matter either as it relates to an anti-trust case. UConn has no right to be in a P5 conference just because they are the best program that is left on the outside (BYU would argue otherwise). UConn being in or out of a P5 conference also has nothing to do with an anti-trust case other than determining whether UConn is a plaintiff or a defendant in the eventual lawsuit.
Every single non-P5 school is impacted by the collusive behavior of the P5, not just UConn. The exclusionary bowl affiliations is exactly what the P5 has done, as is the exclusionary scheduling. Industries can set minimum standards for participation, but those standards can not be set in a manner as to create a cartel. In a lot of industries, the securities industry for example, it results in a gray area.
I had a professor in grad school that was one of the top advisors and expert witnesses in the world for anti-trust litigation. I wouldn't consider myself an expert by any means, but two classes with this guy exposed me to a lot of the core principles of anti-trust laws. One of his favorite phrases was "it's not illegal to be a monopoly, but it is illegal to act like a monopolist". Market share is just one of the standards by which anti-competitive behavior is measured, although without a significant market share by the defendent(s), a successful anti-trust litigation is impossible. Intel had to cough up $1.25 billion primarily because their market share was too big. Most successful litigation is a result of collusion (AMD, multiple airline cases, Salomon Treasury price fixing, etc.).
Collusion or any kind of coordinated action between competitors to restrict access to markets or fix prices is a foundation of any anti-trust action, and together with a big market share, usually determinative of the outcome of any litigation. In this case, we have 65 competitors working together publicly to restrict access to markets and fix prices (through bowl revenue allocations), and these 65 competitors probably comprise about 90% of the market as a result of their actions.
If you can poke a hole in that argument, let me know.